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Introduction 
 
 
US Foreign Policy after the 2016 Elections 
Presidential Contenders’ Opposing Concepts and Domestic Political Dynamics 
Marco Overhaus and Lars Brozus 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are an unlikely couple. She the experienced politi-
cian and former Secretary of State, he the outsider, whose opinions frequently appear 
crude and contradictory. Moreover, they both advocate completely different ideals as 
far as America’s role in the world is concerned. Clinton champions a liberal international 
order, to the preservation of which the USA is dedicating significant resources, while 
Trump is putting his chips on “America first”. Which of these ideals will shape US politics 
in the future does not solely depend on the presidential election results. The policy re-
alignment currently being implemented by the two major parties could prove just as 
relevant. 
 
The US primaries indicate that both Demo-
crats and Republicans are realigning their 
policies in order to accommodate the prefer-
ences of important voter groups. Processes of 
social transformation including demographic 
change, the greater politicisation of minor-
ities and growing social inequality are forc-
ing both parties to remobilise sections of 
the electorate and get new ones on board. 
For a considerable period of time, the 
leadership of the Republican Party espoused 
a foreign and economic policy which 
resulted in economic disadvantages in the 
eyes of an important group of their voters. 
According to Donald Trump’s catchy state-
ments, deregulation, free trade orientation, 
a liberal immigration policy and the sup-
port of global military alliances have com-
pounded to provoke the impoverishment 
of the white American working and middle 
classes. His success demonstrates that 
the Republicans’ strategy of propagating 
socially conservative values in “compen-
sation” for a policy which comes at the 
economic expense of its own voters no 
longer delivers the goods. 
The Democrat leadership is also feeling 
the pressure to accommodate the prefer-
ences of important swathes of the elector-
ate. Hillary Clinton is relying on the so-
called “Obama coalition”, consisting of 
ethnic and sexual minorities. They are 
pursuing a domestic agenda, focusing, 
for example, on the dismantling of social, 
economic and political discrimination. 
Simultaneously, Clinton’s internal oppo-
nent Bernie Sanders is pushing for even 
more emphasis on issues of social justice. 
How large a punch this party policy re-
alignment actually packs is a contentious 
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issue within the US debate. If it persists, it 
could result in a stronger domestic orienta-
tion in the USA. 
Liberal internationalism versus 
Jacksonian populism 
Since the Second World War, US foreign 
policy has been marked by a school of 
thought known as “liberal international-
ism”. This operates on the premise that a 
liberal international order, interpreted as a 
network of inter- and multinational norms, 
regulations and institutions, is in America’s 
interest. This applies, above all, from an 
economic perspective, as far as trade and 
financial relations are concerned, but also 
includes a liberal immigration policy. Part of 
this fundamental foreign policy consensus 
is not only the implicitness of an American 
leadership role, but, in addition, the crea-
tion of international alliances and their 
consolidation via a global network of for-
eign military bases, which are required to 
take action against “troublemakers”. 
As a leading figure, Hillary Clinton 
embodies this cross-party consensus like 
almost no other. She has supported the free 
trade policy of her husband, the then presi-
dent Bill Clinton, since the 1990s, whose 
tally included the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). She voted in favour 
of the 2003 Iraq War, and championed 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) as Secretary of State under 
Obama. She also endorsed the deployment 
of the US military several times – in Libya 
in 2011, for instance. 
By contrast, Donald Trump is pursuing a 
foreign policy vision in which international 
relations equate to a zero-sum game. This 
paradigm holds that the USA neglects its 
own security if it supports the security of 
other countries. If, for example, the USA 
deploys its forces throughout the world 
in order to protect foreign borders, it is 
putting the security of its own citizens in 
second place. If China benefits from WTO 
accession, factories in the USA close and 
American workers lose their jobs. 
Trump’s statements to date are indica-
tive of a marked disinterest in questions of 
international order. The key phrase of his 
rudimentary foreign policy agenda, “Ameri-
ca first”, underscores the fact that US inter-
ests are the top priority, particularly those 
of the American working and middle 
classes. Trump wishes to use international 
politics to push through “better deals”. The 
allies in Europe and Asia should pay more 
for their security, and the USA should no 
longer be disadvantaged by international 
agreements. This applies both to the Paris 
Agreement under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
as well as to the TPP and the TTIP. 
All this does not make Donald Trump an 
isolationist. He has announced his inten-
tion to increase funding for the US military, 
and to take extreme action against the 
“Islamic State” and other terror organisa-
tions – and, something characteristic of his 
position – this without concern for the 
standards of international law. 
Trump is piggybacking on a political tra-
dition christened “Jacksonian Populism” by 
American political scientist Walter Russell 
Mead, named for the 7th President of the 
USA. The historical and cultural roots of 
this tradition lie in the frontier experiences 
of the white, Protestant settlers and early 
farmer communities. They literally fenced 
themselves off from their hostile environ-
ment, and went to considerable expense in 
order to defend the borders of their settle-
ment spaces. Although “Jacksonian Popu-
lism” has always featured in the USA’s 
foreign policy debate, it was not a major 
influence for most of the time. 
Against the background of these foreign 
policy alternatives and domestic dynamics, 
three scenarios appear plausible for the out-
come of the elections and their foreign 
policy implications. 
Scenario 1: President Donald Trump 
In the first scenario, Trump, should he be 
elected the 45th President of the United 
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States on 8 November 2016, would imple-
ment his foreign policy agenda predomi-
nantly using uni- and bilateral strategies. He 
would increase the pressure on the allies, 
demanding greater financial contribution 
to international security from them. In 
terms of trade policy, he would condemn 
what he sees as the unfair valuation of the 
Chinese currency, and threaten punitive 
tariffs. TTIP would either be off the table or 
put on the back burner. Trump would also 
attempt to back out of international agree-
ments such as the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change. 
His critics on both sides of the Atlantic 
can hope that he would be restrained by 
the system of checks and balances in place 
in the US political system. The US consti-
tution divides the authority over foreign 
policy between the President and the Con-
gress. In principle, three ways for Congress 
to influence foreign policy exist, namely via 
budget legislation, its confirmation of high-
ranking government posts and its consent 
to internationally binding treaties. 
Historically, the USA’s political system 
has increasingly been characterised by the 
centralisation of foreign policy authority 
in the executive, particularly in the White 
House. The growing workforce at the White 
House, including the National Security 
Council, is a clear indication of this. On 
the one hand, the presidential office is 
strengthened by this development, while, 
on the other, the President is subject to 
internal constraints, reliant on an increas-
ingly large team of advisers which does not, 
however, share his visions unequivocally. 
This would also apply in the event that 
President Trump decided to prune the out-
growths of presidential bureaucracy. The 
pool of qualified government officials is 
limited, even in Washington, and many of 
these are close to the “foreign policy estab-
lishment” rejected by Trump. 
Whether and to what extent President 
Trump could be reined in by Congress or 
his own bureaucracy depends on the the-
matic issues in question. Congress tends 
to play a more significant role in areas 
including trade, migration and develop-
ment cooperation than it does in issues of 
national security and military operations. 
However, the elected representatives are 
frequently only able to exercise a power of 
veto as opposed to bringing about effective 
agenda-setting. It follows that Congress 
might be able to thwart an entry ban for 
Muslims, but would be unable to force the 
Trump administration to promote an inter-
national free trade agenda. 
It should also be remembered that, in 
times of crises, US presidents enjoy far 
greater room for manoeuvre than in “nor-
mal” times. After the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001, for example, President 
George W. Bush considerably expanded the 
powers of the executive, placing particular 
emphasis on the intelligence agencies. 
Scenario 2: Clinton wins, 
Trump disappears 
This scenario reflects the widely-held 
assumption that the strong showing by 
the anti-establishment candidates in the 
primaries will remain a flash in the pan. 
If Clinton should win the presidential elec-
tions, Trump and his populist visions of 
foreign and domestic policy will vanish 
into oblivion. Ultimately, the fundamental 
foreign policy consensus in the USA will 
win through. This supposition is based, 
not least, on past experiences of the rise 
and fall of earlier populists. In 1992, for in-
stance, the billionaire Ross Perot, standing 
as an independent candidate, scored several 
successes in the presidential election cam-
paign against his opponents George H. W. 
Bush and Bill Clinton, but left scarcely a 
political trace. 
Hillary Clinton is widely regarded as a 
hawk as far as security and defence policy 
is concerned. Despite setbacks in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, she considers US military 
interventions a viable instrument. As a 
result, it would be reasonable to expect 
Clinton to adhere to several key aspects 
of her predecessor’s foreign policy while 
simultaneously displaying fewer reserva-
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tions about deploying the US military in 
international crisis regions than Obama. 
Her foreign policy would continue to reflect 
the vision of international liberalism, par-
ticularly if the Republican Party is able to 
divest itself of Donald Trump’s domestic 
and foreign policy demands. 
Scenario 3: Clinton in a changing 
political landscape 
By contrast, the third scenario starts from 
the premise that both parties will orient 
themselves permanently to the expecta-
tions of remobilised or newly-acquired sec-
tions of the electorate. 
The Democratic Party is moving further 
into the liberal spectrum (to the left in a 
European sense), relying as it is increasingly 
on voters with a pronounced interest in 
issues surrounding identity politics. They 
are concerned with topics including the 
equality of women or curbing the discrimi-
nation of minorities by the police and the 
justice system (“Black Lives Matter”). The 
Democrats are also coming under pressure 
from the supporters of Bernie Sanders to 
focus more strongly on social inequality 
and the influence of the finance industry. 
That Clinton took an ambivalent stand on 
TPP and TTIP during the election campaign, 
which contradicted her policy as Secretary 
of State in some respects, might be 
indicative of this development. 
As far as the Republicans are concerned, 
voter preferences, some of which are dia-
metrically opposed to the official party line, 
were asserted during the primaries under 
Donald Trump’s representation. It is clear 
that important sections of the electorate 
are no longer willing to tolerate what they 
deem the negative effects of economic de-
regulation and liberalisation, i.e. the loss 
of well-paid industrial jobs and the increase 
in precarious employment in the service 
industry. In this third scenario, the party 
will thus continue to be shaped by these 
views even if Trump loses the election. 
In future, Clinton’s own party will force 
her to pursue a social and liberal domestic 
agenda, and, above all, to concentrate her 
attention on solving domestic problems. 
Although the “new” Republicans do not 
share this “socially liberal” domestic agenda, 
they are aiming for a stronger domestic 
orientation and a strict foreign policy align-
ment to the USA’s national economic inter-
ests. In the final analysis, Clinton’s foreign 
policy will become less internationalist and 
less interventionist than one might assume 
on the basis of her hitherto stated posi-
tions.  
Conclusion: 
transatlantic dissonance 
The first and third scenarios are tanta-
mount to a stronger domestic orientation 
for the USA. Although phases like this have 
always been anticipated in the past, they 
have never resulted in major distortions in 
transatlantic relations. This may well be the 
case once more. To date, however, the USA’s 
foreign policy commitment has rested on 
a broad domestic foundation, in line with 
the liberal international order influenced 
by Washington. In the event that this should 
change in view of a stronger orientation by 
both parties to voter groups that are becom-
ing strategically more important, future 
US administrations may take a far firmer, 
more forceful line with their partners and 
allies. 
That said, this would certainly apply more 
in the case of a Trump presidency than it 
would if Clinton won the election. However, 
even if the latter scenario materialises, Ger-
many and the EU should prepare them-
selves for ever louder calls from Washing-
ton to demonstrate greater commitment to 
the preservation of international order and 
to make greater contributions. As a result, 
the need for Berlin and Brussels to define 
and express their own expectations towards 
US policies becomes all the more pressing. 
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